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Abstract 
This paper examines the career moves of executives between two different
organizations and looks at the characteristics of executives’ employing
organizations as a predictor of the success of the moves. The paper uses a
proprietary data set of a retained executive search firm that contains 
information on the career paths of executives in the financial services
industry. The results show that the perceived operational excellence of
executives’ employing organization has a significant signaling power for
other employers and strongly impacts the success of executives’ moves
across different organizations. The data also reveal that executives may use
their employment spell at reputable, large-sized, public organizations as a 
conscious career-building mechanism and accept smaller promotions to 
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The analysis of the factors that propel executives to the top of organizational 
hierarchies has always been of central interest to researchers, research on career advancement 
going back to the 1920’s. This research domain, however, needs to be revisited because today 
the reality of careers is different. 
 
Changes in the global economy in the late 1980’s brought about changes in individual 
career paths: in place of the “traditional” employment model that relied on employment 
security and a promotion-from-within policy often with prospects of lifetime employment, 
careers in the “new” model ceased to signify upward progress through a single organizational 
hierarchy; rather, they became moves across the boundaries of different employers (Hall, 
1996). Executives were no exception from under this trend. Global executive turnover 
dramatically increased in the 1990s (Lucier et al., 2002). Besides, a growing number of 
companies rely on outsider successors (Murphy & Zabojnik, 2003). 
 
In this new environment, executives’ corporate affiliation shapes their career 
advancement even more powerfully than before and serves as a tool for employers and 
recruiters to make inferences about executives’ performance. Admittedly, recruiters lure talent 
from “academy companies” like Federal Express, General Electric, McKinsey & Co., 
PepsiCo. and Procter & Gamble. These companies are known for their commitment to the 




Academic research, however, has almost ignored the new reality of executive careers. 
Despite the increasing rate of executive mobility across organizations, research has mostly 
examined executive mobility within the same organization, or failed to distinguish between 
transitions within a single organization and across different organizations. There are 
surprisingly few papers that examine career moves between different organizations (Sullivan, 
1999). 
 
Further, despite the widely recognized notion that executives’ corporate affiliation 
shapes their career paths, little academic research addressed the organization-level predictors 
of executive career advancement (Hall, 2001). The literature on the predictors of managerial 
and executive career advancement has tended to focus on individual-level determinants: 
psychological traits, human capital determinants (education and work experience) and 
demographic attributes (age, gender and marital status). 
 
Finally, the target population of most research on executive mobility is the CEO and 
the top management team, while mid- and lower-level executives have not received 
considerable academic attention. (e.g. Weisbach, 1988; Allgood & Farrell, 2000; Walsh, 
1988; Wiersema & Bantel, 1993). Only few papers sample executives other than CEOs or 
board members: Krug & Hegarty (2001) differentiate between “senior managers” (Chairman, IE Working Paper                                    RH8-105-I                                04/11/2004 
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CEO, COO and President) and “other” top managers. Papers by Bretz et al. (1994), Judge et 
al. (1995) and Boudreau et al. (2001) sample executives in an executive search firm’s 
database. The average executive is two levels below the CEO. 
  
Research, however, on lower-level executive populations is needed, because career 
advancement may be most strongly predicted by different sets of predictors for different 
executive populations. Wiersema and Bantel (1993) find that second-tier executives are more 
likely to leave organizations for performance-related reasons than the first tier. Walsh (1988) 
concludes that more senior-level executives were more likely to leave after a merger 
announcement than other executive groups. Therefore, analyses of an executive population 




The contributions of this paper are threefold: it examines the outcome of executives’ 
career moves between two different organizations. It incorporates both the individual- and 
organization-level predictors of career advancement. Further, it looks at the career 
advancement of a much broader executive population than it was done in most previous 
studies.  
 
Organization-level predictors. Since very few empirical papers have explored the 
predictors of executive career advancement in the case of career moves across organizations, 
the paper relies on signaling theory for hypothesis building (Spence, 1974). Signaling theory 
argues that employers are unsure of the productive capabilities of individuals at the time of 
making a hire. What employers observe are the visible cues such as age, educational 
background, past accomplishments and career velocity used by individuals to signal their 
performance (Rosenbaum, 1984). This paper argues that the characteristics of the organization 
that executives are at the helm of may signal executives’ performance: executives affiliated 
with financially well-performing, large, prestigious public organizations are more attractive 
for other employers and will receive larger promotions as they move to another employer. 
  
Although no empirical research has examined how the status of executives’ employing 
organization impacts executive career advancement, the issue has been explored in other 
contexts. Useem and Karabel (1986) found that ascent to top corporate positions was most 
strongly influenced by an executive earning a Bachelor’s degree, an MBA degree or a law 
degree from a top-ranking college or university. An MBA degree, however, did not 
significantly help those executives who earned a Bachelor’s degree from a top-ranking 
institution, because the prestige of the Bachelor’s institution alone propelled the executive 
into a high-ranking position. Another stream of research has looked at the effect of the 
prestige of academic institutions on the career paths of young scientists. This literature argues 
that outside constituents assume that the values of the degree-granting institution are reflected 
in the scientists’ personal attributes and achievements. Crane (1965) found that scientists who 
attended a major prestigious university were more recognized by their peers. Long, Allison & 
McGinnis (1979) showed a correlation of 0.39 between the prestige of biochemists’ doctoral 
institution and the prestige of their first job. Debackere & Rappa (1995) found that in a 
sample of US universities the prestige of scientists’ graduate school was a significant IE Working Paper                                 RH8-105-I                               04/11/2004 
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indicator of the prestige of their academic appointment. Further, employers are more eager to 
hire from the “market leaders” because it is an effective means of obtaining resources such as 
desirable knowledge and skills that the organization does not currently possess (Haveman, 
1993; Boeker, 1997; Rao & Drazin, 2002).  
 
Hypothesis 1: Executives in organizations that are perceived as excellent by others 
will make more successful career moves to another employer. 
 
Corporate financial performance as a signal. Outsiders often attribute disappointing 
corporate financial performance to the capabilities of the top management team. The 
organizational measures that signal a CEO’s non-satisfactory performance on the job include 
low stock returns (Weisbach, 1988; Barro & Barro, 1990; Allgood & Farrell, 2000) and low 
values of share performance (Warner & Watts, 1988). Above-par financial performance, on 
the other hand, signals to outsiders that the organization is run by capable executives. Rao and 
Drazin (2002) approximate managers’ expertise in the mutual fund industry with the 
immediate past performance of mutual fund companies. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Executives in organizations with above-par financial performance will 
make more successful career moves to another employer. 
 
Organizational Size as a Signal. Large organizations provide more operational 
complexity and greater management challenges for their executives, and offer higher salaries, 
a greater range of benefits, more employment security and better training opportunities 
(Brown, Hamilton, & Medoff, 1990). As a result, larger organizations attract more qualified 
executives (Nystrom & McArthur, 1989). Since they facilitate executives to both bring and 
develop higher skills on the job, the executives employed by large-sized organizations will be 
more attractive for other employers. Rao and Drazin (2002), for example, use the size of fund 
managers’ organizations as an approximation for managers’ expertise in the mutual funds 
industry. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Executives in large-sized organizations will make more successful 
career moves to another employer. 
 
Public Status as a Signal. Executives in public organizations earn more promotions 
than in private companies (Judge et al., 1995). Public organizations are also characterized by 
greater operational stability (Nystrom & McArthur, 1989), which makes them more attractive 
for job seekers. Since public organizations attract more job candidates, they will naturally end 
up with a more qualified pool of employees. The employees of public organizations, in turn, 
will be more attractive for other employers. 
 
Hypothesis 4: Executives in public organizations will make more successful career 
moves to another employer. 
 
Signals towards job seekers. Key organizational attributes serve not only as a signal 
of executive characteristics, but also as an information processing shortcut when executives 
make a decision about joining a firm (Jones & Murrell, 2001). Job seekers find firms with IE Working Paper                                   RH8-105-I                               04/11/2004 
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corporate social performance (Turban & Greening, 1997; Jones & Murrell, 2001) and a 
favorable labor market reputation (Chauvin & Guthrie, 1994) more attractive and are more 
likely to seek employment with them (Turban & Greening, 1997; Jones & Murrell, 2001). 
They may even adjust their compensation expectations and forgo some economic benefit to 
work for organizations with a good labor market reputation (Chauvin & Guthrie, 1994). No 
empirical research, however, has explored organizational signals other than labor market 
reputation and social performance. This paper looks at four additional organizational 
characteristics: perceived operational excellence, above-par financial performance, public 
status and large size. Executives may be more eager to join such organizations because they 
offer better working conditions (Nystrom & McArthur, 1989; Brown et al., 1990; Judge et al., 
1995). They may also join them in the hopes that it will trigger their subsequent career, 
because other employers – as Hypotheses 1 to 4 point out – may find executives affiliated 
with such organizations more attractive.  
 
Hypothesis 5: Executives will accept smaller promotions to join organizations with a 
perceived operational excellence. 
 
Hypothesis 6: Executives will accept smaller promotions to join organizations with 
above-par financial performance. 
 
Hypothesis 7: Executives will accept smaller promotions to join large-sized 
organizations. 
 
Hypothesis 8: Executives will accept smaller promotions to join public organizations. 
 
Control variables: Human capital attributes. Human capital attributes signify the 
investment by an individual to increase his or her value at work and on the job market, and 
include educational credentials and work-related experience. Human capital attributes have 
represented the strongest and most consistent predictors of managerial career advancement 
(Kirchmeyer, 1998). This paper uses years of education, an MBA degree, executives’ tenure 
on the job and international experience to control for an executive’s human capital stock.  
 
Years of education has been the most heavily used signal of worker ability (Becker, 
1975). It was empirically shown to be a key factor in accessing high-paying, high-status jobs 
(e.g. Judge et al., 1995; Melamed, 1996; Tharenou, 1997). 
 
The most accepted professional degree in the financial services industry, where the 
sample of the current paper is taken from, is the Master of Business Administration (MBA) 
degree. While an MBA degree has been empirically shown to favorably impact executive 
career advancement, it had a positive effect only in terms of pay, but not in terms of the 
number of promotions received by executives (Useem & Karabel, 1986; Tharenou, 1997). In 
the case of career moves across organizations, however, an MBA degree may be a more 
important signal of executive capabilities, since employers do not have as many cues to judge 
executives’ performance as in the case of the intra-organizational promotion decisions 
examined by most previous empirical papers. 
 IE Working Paper                                RH8-105-I                              04/11/2004 
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  Job tenure, the number of years that executives spent in their previous job, serves as a 
proxy for executives’ experience and mobility. Research has not been conclusive on the effect 
of job tenure on career advancement. Melamed (1996) and Rao & Drazin (2002) predicted a 
positive relationship between job tenure and career advancement, arguing that tenure signified 
executives’ job-related expertise. Cox and Harquail (1991) and Gattiker and Larwood (1988), 
on the other hand, showed that long job tenure caused career stagnation and signaled that 
executives reached their peak in an organization. Finally, executives’ international work 




Data Collection and Sample. The data come from the proprietary search database of 
a global retained executive search firm. The cross-sectional database, created in April 2002, 
contains information on 14,000 executives in the global
1 financial services sector. This paper 
uses a random sample of 2,000 executives. The executives in the database were identified by 
the executive search firm from industry publications and directories and on the basis of the 
recommendations of clients and key industry players.  
 
Data on individual executives include information on the executive’s current and past 
jobs (the name of the employing organization, the executive’s title, function and function 
segment, industry affiliation, industry segment and the month and year when the executive 
started and ended the job), as well as educational background and international experience. 
Additional data on executives’ employing organizations (size, public status, presence on 
industry rankings, financial performance) were collected from the Hoover’s and Compustat 
databases. Unfortunately, the proprietary database of the executive search firm does not have 
information on a key measure of career advancement, compensation, and on some potentially 
important predictors of career advancement: the executives’ gender and age. This information 
was impossible to obtain: the executives’ name was deleted from the search database by the 
search firm due to a confidentiality agreement, while executives’ age and marital status were 
not recorded by the search firm for legal reasons. 
 
The database contains information on every type of executive: CEO-s and 
Chairpersons (32%), Executive Vice Presidents (13%), Senior Vice Presidents (17%) and 
Vice presidents (19%). They are employed in four segments of the financial services industry: 
investment banks and securities (42%), asset and money management firms (26%), banks 
(20%) and finance companies (12%). The executives are highly qualified: 55 per cent earned 
a Master’s degree, 6 per cent a Ph.D., 42 per cent an MBA and only 0.1% exclusively a high 
school diploma. The average executive is employed by a large-sized company with over 
33,000 employees and $19 million in sales. 30 per cent of the employing organizations are 
included in Fortune magazine’s America’s or Global Most Admired Companies rankings. 
Based on their human capital attributes, the executives in this sample are very comparable to 
the sample of executives, also sampled by an executive search firm, in Bretz et al., (1994) and 
                                                 
1 86% of the executives got their work experience in the US, while 14% of the executives 
worked for financial services firm all over the world, including Canada, South America, 
Europe and Asia. IE Working Paper                                RH8-105-I                              04/11/2004 
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Judge et al. (2001). Those executives are somewhere between the average manager and the 
corporate elite. 
 
Measures. The analyses in this paper look at a single career move from executives’ 
former job to the current one. “Former” variables signify attributes of the job that the 
executive leaves. “Current” attributes represent the characteristics of the job that the executive 
transitions to. 
  
Career advancement was approximated by the size of the promotion, demotion or 
lateral transfer received by executives during the career move. It was calculated as the 
difference in levels between the executive’s current and former positions. In order to obtain 
this difference, executive titles/positions were coded: the numbers assigned to executives’ 
current and former positions ranged from 1 to 8. The codes distinguished between (1) non-
managerial positions and seven types of managerial/executive positions: (2) managers, (3) 
directors, (4) assistant vice presidents, (5) vice presidents, (6) chief functional officers (CTOs, 
CFOs, etc.) and senior vice presidents, (7) executive vice presidents and (8) 
CEOs/Presidents/partners/founders. Since no other directory provides information on the 
hierarchy of executive positions, titles were coded on the basis of Dun & Bradstreet’s 
Directory of Corporations, which publishes executive biographies. Further, no previous 
empirical research, the coding scheme of which could have been applied to these analyses, 
has used such an in-depth (with regards to the number of different positions) and 
comprehensive (regarding the range of executive positions) coding scheme as the present 
study (cp. Ellis & Heneman, 1990; Lambert et al., 1993; Melamed, 1996, etc.). In order to 
compute Career advancement, the code assigned to the executive’s previous position was 
deducted from the code assigned to the current position. Career advancement takes 15 values, 
with a minimum value of –7 and a maximum of 7, a mean of 0.64 and a standard deviation of 
2.31. Negative values of Career advancement represent a demotion from the former to the 
current position, a 0 value represents a lateral transfer, while a positive value a promotion. 
Descriptive statistics show that the average executive was promoted .64 levels. While 43 per 
cent of the executives earned a promotion, 38 per cent of the executives made a lateral 
transfer and 19 per cent were demoted. Table 1 shows examples for promotions, demotions 
and lateral transfers. 
 
-- Insert Table 1 here -- 
 
Control Variables. The paper uses the binary variable Same company to indicate 
whether the executives moved to a different organization as they changed jobs. The analyses 
include two firm fixed effects variables to control for the unmeasured characteristics of 
executives’ former and current employing organizations. To account for the differential 
promotional potential of various positions, binary variables representing the highest- and the 
lowest-ranking positions were used (C-level, EVP-level, Director-level, Managers, Non-
managerial level). The paper uses the following industry controls (1. asset management 
companies, 2. banks, 3. finance companies, 4. investment banks, and 5. industries outside 
financial services in the case of executives’ former position) and four binary variables that 
represent functional affiliation (1. finance, 2. general management, 3. professional and 4. IE Working Paper                                   RH8-105-I                                04/11/2004 
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support functions). Creating the categories, the executive search firm’s own notification was 
observed.   
   
MBA degree is a binary variable (0/1). International experience is also binary (0/1) 
and signifies either one of two types of experience: a US-born executive who has worked in a 
country other than the United States, or a foreign-born executive working for a foreign branch 
of a US company or for a foreign company outside the US. The executive’s tenure on the job, 
measured in years, was computed by deducting the starting date of the executive’s job from 
the date when the executive moved to his or her new position.  
 
Organizational Characteristics. Perceived operational excellence was computed on 
the basis of Fortune magazine’s “America’s most admired” and “Global most admired” 
rankings. The Fortune rankings ask 10,000 executives, directors, and securities analysts to 
rate the ten largest companies (by revenues) in 58 industries based on eight criteria: 
innovation, financial soundness, employee talent, use of corporate assets, long-term 
investment value, social responsibility, quality of management, and quality of products and 
services. The compound score ranges from 1 to 10 (Sung & Tkaczyk, 2002). Executive search 
consultants in the financial services practice consider the Fortune rankings one of the most 
reliable sources of company status rankings.
2 
 
Public status is a binary variable (1=public organization). Organization size was 
approximated as the logarithm of the annual sales of the organization. The paper used the 
following measures of corporate financial performance: sales per employee, sales growth, net 
income,  net income as a percentage of sales and net income as a percentage of assets. 
Financial information on the executive’s former organization was collected from the year that 




In order to compute the dependent variable, career advancement, information on both 
the current as well as the former position of the executive is used. Unfortunately, information 
on the executives’ former position was often missing from the analyses and career 
advancement could not be computed in 30.15 per cent of the 2,000 observations. Since the 
executives included in the analyses differed in systematic ways from the executives not 
included due to the missing values of the dependent variable, the Heckman selection model 
was used to analyze the impact of organizational characteristics on executive career 
advancement (Heckman, 1979). The Heckman model corrects for sample selection bias that 
                                                 
2 Alternatively, the paper experimented with other measures: the Vault “Top Finance 
Firms” score, The American Banker Magazine’s reputation rankings and a weighted 
compound score of the Fortune, the Vault and The American Banker scores. The sign of the 
coefficients for the alternative measures did not show any difference in the case of the 
characteristics of the former organization, but the significance of the coefficients did differ. In 
the case of current organizational characteristics, both the significance and the sign of the 
coefficients were similar. 
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may threaten the generalizability of the findings in the analyses. It is a two-stage process 
where the first regression, the selection equation, uses a regression model to predict the 
dependent variable and the second, the main equation, incorporates the estimates of the 
parameters from the first regression equation. 
  
In the current analyses, three variables consistently come out as significant in the first, 
the selection equations:  Current position has a positive, Current tenure a negative and 
Candidate status a positive coefficient. These findings indicate that executives whose career 
advancement indicator is observable tend to be higher up in the organizational hierarchy 
(current position is .215, p<.001), have a shorter tenure in their current job (current tenure is 
.007, p<.001), and are more likely to have established a longer-term relationship, i.e. engaged 
in a phone or a face-to-face interview with the search firm (the coefficient for Candidate 
status is .073, p<.1). The p-value for the selection equation is highly significant (p<.001), 
indicating that standard regression models that predict executive Career advancement would 
have yielded biased results and the use of the Heckman selection model is justified.    
 
The first set of models (three models) predicts Career advancement from the 
characteristics of the organization that executives leave: “former” organization. The second 
set of models (three models) uses the characteristics of the organizations where executives 
transition to (current organization), to predict Career advancement. The third set of models 
uses the difference in the characteristics of the organization that executives leave and the ones 




  Table 2 presents the means, standard deviations and Pearson correlations for the key 
variables. Career advancement correlates significantly with the size of the organization that 
executives leave (.076, p<.05), and the size (-.06, p<.05) and perceived operational excellence 
(-.066, p<.05) of the organization that executives move to. 
 
-- Insert Table 2 here -- 
 
Table 3 captures the impact of executives’ former organizational affiliation (the 
organization that executives leave) on executive career advancement.  
 
-- Insert Table 3 here -- 
 
Model 1 of Table 3 enters the control variables. None of the variables that represent 
the executives’ industry and functional affiliation are significant. The variables for former C-
level and EVP-level positions are negative and highly significant (-1.76 and -1.13; p<.001), 
confirming the fact that executives who are further up in the organizational hierarchy attain 
smaller promotions. The three lowest-ranking positions (non-managerial, managerial and 
director-level) have positive and strongly significant coefficients, indicating that executives 
who transition from these positions are more likely to receive higher promotions. Model 2 of 
Table 3 enters the human capital controls: MBA degree is positive and significant (.29; 
p<0.1), indicating that executives who have earned the degree make more successful moves IE Working Paper                                  RH8-105-I                                04/11/2004 
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between employers. Years of education, job tenure and international experience, however, 
remain non-significant
3. The non-significant coefficient for years of education is probably due 
to the fact that there is little variation among the executives across education (99.9 per cent of 
the executives have at least a Bachelor’s degree). The non-significant coefficient for 
international experience contradicts previous research. The findings of the current study are 
reasonable, however, if we consider the way the variable was constructed: executives with 
international experience include both US executives with international experience and 
foreign-born executives. Foreign-born executives may accept smaller promotions than they 
would receive elsewhere, to join a US company. This especially applies, given the time frame 
of the database: in 2002 when the database was created, the average current tenure of 
executives was 3.8 years. That is, most of the transitions captured by the database took place 
between 1997 and 2000, a period when the US economy was booming and the prospect of 
joining a US company was especially attractive for foreign executives. The human capital 
attributes make a significant addition to the model (F=8.67, p<.01). 
 
Finally, Model 3 of Table 3 enters the characteristics of the organization that 
executives leave. Contrary to expectations, organizational characteristics do not make a 
significant addition to the equation (F=3.51, p>.1). Only perceived operational excellence is 
significant (.046, p<.1), size and public status remain non-significant. None of the financial 
performance indicators (sales per employee,  sales growth, net income,  net income as a 
percentage of sales and net income as a percentage of total assets) are significant
4. This is 
puzzling, given the stream of literature on involuntary CEO turnover (Warner et al., 1988; 
Weisbach, 1988; Barro & Barro, 1990; Allgood & Farrell, 2000), which shows a significant 
correlation between non-satisfactory corporate financial performance and CEO dismissal. 
However, this paper relies on a broader executive population than previous studies. For lower-
level executives corporate financial performance may not adequately signal their 
performance. Measures that reflect the performance of the functions, divisions or branches led 
by lower-level executives may be better signals. Second, anecdotal evidence reveals that a 
corporation’s image of excellence does not always exclude its temporary financial turmoil, 
while executive performance is not always judged by financial performance. The search firm 
that provided the data set for the analyses admitted that they preferred luring executives from 
organizations undergoing financial turmoil, because their executives had the same caliber but 
were easier to attract. 
 
From among the individual- and organization-level predictors of executive career 
advancement, human capital attributes are more important predictors than organization-level 
variables. Although the results support Hypothesis 1, that perceived operational excellence 
                                                 
3 An alternative, binary coding scheme for job tenure, coding the desirable, 2 to 3 years of 
tenure as 1 (Kotter, 1995) and a longer or shorter tenure as 0 failed to result in a more 
significant coefficient for job tenure (-.06, p=.7). 
4 The coefficients, standard errors (in parentheses) and p-values for the financial performance 
variables: Sales growth: .180 (.291) p=.535. Net income: .190 (.449) p=.672. Net income as a 
percentage of sales: .001 (.057) p=.979; Net income as a percentage of total assets: -.069 
(.173) p=.690. 
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positively affects executive career advancement, they fail to gain support for Hypotheses 2, 3 
and 4, which proposed that the executives of large-sized, public organizations with above-par 
financial performance would be more attractive for other employers.   
 
Table 4 presents the characteristics of the organization that executives move to. 
 
-- Insert Table 4 here -- 
 
The control variables that stand for asset management companies and banks have a 
negative, significant coefficient (-.22 and -.23; p<.1), while finance companies have a 
negative, although non-significant coefficient. The omitted variable is investment banks. The 
results reveal that executives who transition to investment banks attain the largest promotions.  
 
Executives who transition to a general management function gain larger promotions 
than executives who transition to other functions (1.15, p<.001), while executives who 
transition to financial consulting firms receive smaller promotions. The human capital 
variables in Table 4 make a significant addition to the model (F=7.84, p<.01). Finally, Model 
3 of Table 4 enters the characteristics of the organization where executives move to. The 
characteristics of the current organization make a more significant addition to the equation 
than the human capital attributes (F=23.69, p<.001), calling attention to the importance of the 
characteristics of the organization that executives move to on career advancement. Size and 
perceived operational excellence have the expected sign: the coefficient for size is negative 
and significant (-0.02; p<.01), indicating that executives who leave for larger organizations 
accept smaller promotions that they may receive if they moved to smaller organizations. This 
result is consistent with the findings of previous literature: executives wish to be affiliated 
with large-sized organizations (Brown, Hamilton, & Medoff, 1990; Nystrom & McArthur, 
1989; etc.), because larger organizations provide more rapid managerial mobility (Nicholson 
& West, 1988), higher salaries and more training opportunities (Brown, Hamilton, & Medoff, 
1990) and present more management challenges and complexity. The coefficient for 
operational excellence is negative and significant (-.05; p<.01), indicating that executives 
who join such organizations accept smaller promotions than in other organizations. The 
results support Hypotheses 5 and 7, which proposed that executives who leave for large-sized 
and well-performing organizations accept smaller promotions to join these organizations. 
While the coefficient for most of the other financial indicators is not significant
5, the 
coefficient for sales growth is significant and negative (-1.923, p<.05), indicating that 
executives accept smaller promotions to join organizations with promising growth prospects. 
Contrary to expectations, executives who join public companies earn larger promotions than 
those joining private companies (.48; p<.01). When public status is recoded, however, using a 
coding scheme that distinguishes between public and private companies during stock market 
boom periods and makes no distinction between them during “bear market” periods, public 
status becomes negative and significant (-.21, p<.05), indicating that executives accept 
                                                 
5 The coefficients, standard errors and p-values of the financial indicators of the organizations 
that executives move to are the following: Net income: coefficient: .266, standard error: .174, 
p=.127; Net income as a percentage of sales: coefficient: -.009, standard error: .010, p=.408; 
Net income as a percentage of total assets: coefficient: .106, standard error: .284, p=.709  IE Working Paper                                    RH8-105-I                               04/11/2004 
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smaller promotions to join public organizations if the prospects seem attractive. Hypothesis 8, 
therefore, is partially supported.   
 
Finally, Table 5 examines the effect of change in job characteristics on the size of the 
promotions received by executives. The analysis here uses a difference-in-difference 
methodology (Chou et al., 2003). I compare the change in the executive’s organizational and 
job characteristics in two time periods (in the former and in the current job). Running a model 
that incorporates the characteristics that represent “change” serves as an additional check on 
the previous analyses. Since the variables that represent change amalgamate the attributes of 
both the executives’ former and current jobs, the results should be consistent with the models 
that contain the characteristics of the current and the former jobs.  
 
-- Insert Table 5 here -- 
 
Model 1 of Table 5 includes the control variables, while Model 2 adds the human 
capital attributes. The results are identical to Table 3. Model 3 of Table 5 adds the industry 
and function change variables to the equation. The results suggest that executives’ move 
across industries and functions does not change the size of the promotion that they receive. 
They also suggest that compared to industry insiders, industry outsiders are not at a 
disadvantage when they enter financial services firms. Looking at the variables that represent 
a change in organizational characteristics, the results indicate that career moves between 
organizations of different size or status do not influence the size of promotions received by 
executives. They also show that executives who transition from companies with little to those 
with much perceived operational excellence accept smaller promotion that they would receive 
if they transitioned between peer companies. Executives who move the other way round earn 
the largest promotions. These results are consistent with the findings of the previous two 
tables. The models that incorporate the change in organizational characteristics make a 
significant addition to the equation (F=14, p<.01). 
 
Discussion and conclusions 
 
This paper addressed the organization-level  predictors of executive career moves 
between different organizations for a broad executive population and contributed to a stream 
of empirical research that has overwhelmingly focused on the individual-level predictors of 
career advancement dominantly within the same organization, and for a narrow executive 
population of the CEO and the top management team. 
 
The paper proposed that organization-level variables have a signaling function and 
may be considered a proxy for executive capabilities. The results did not support this 
assumption: the block of organization-level variables in Table 3 did not make a significant 
addition to the model. Perceived operational excellence was the only significant predictor of 
executive career advancement. The fact that a perceived measure of organizational 
performance is related, while actual measures of organizational performance (financial 
indicators) or the organizational characteristics that may signal the capabilities of executives 
(the size of the organizations managed) are not related to the size of the promotions, points to 
the biases in the process of executive selection by companies. The results are consistent with IE Working Paper                                  RH8-105-I                             04/11/2004 
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the ways in which boards of directors choose CEOs (Khurana, 2002). Khurana argues that 
boards’ perception of a CEO candidate is largely determined by the CEO’s previous 
employer. The most demanded CEOs come from employers who have a status higher than 
that of the recruiting organization. Boards most commonly obtain status-related judgments 
from rankings such as those produced by Fortune magazine or Business Week. The 
executive’s actual performance in a prestigious organization matters less for these recruiting 
decisions. Khurana labels this process social matching. Boards resort to social matching, 
because it is difficult to obtain relevant information on the CEO candidate’s performance 
from other sources. Social matching also serves as a legitimating mechanism, because it 
produces “defensible” candidates. 
 
Second, the paper has proposed that organizational characteristics also have a 
signaling power to outsider executives and they influence the attractiveness of the 
organization for job candidates. In the models that used the characteristics of the current job, 
organization-level variables more strongly predicted career advancement than human capital 
attributes. Perceived operational excellence, organizational size, the recoded public status 
variable and sales growth had negative and significant coefficients, implying that executives 
accept smaller promotions to join larger, financially promising and well-performing 
organizations. The findings contribute to previous empirical research in the signaling stream 
(Chauvin & Guthrie, 1994; Turban & Greening, 1997; Jones & Murrell, 1997) in two ways. 
They identify additional organizational characteristics (size, operational excellence, public 
status during “bullish” stock market periods and sales growth) that influence the attractiveness 
of the organization for job seekers. Second, they empirically test the proposition that 
executives not only find “excellent” organizations more attractive (Turban & Greening, 1997; 
Jones & Murrell, 2001), but accept smaller promotions to join these organizations. Although a 
similar proposition has been made in previous research (both Chauvin & Guthrie, 1994 and 
Roberts & Dowling, 2002 stated that “employees preferred to work for high-prestige firms, 
and should therefore work harder, or for lower remuneration”), it has not been empirically 
tested. Finally, the results call attention to the fact that the kinds of organizations that 
executives move to are an important determinant of the outcome of their career move, and an 
aspect of the research on career advancement that has not been examined, but need to be 
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Table 2. Means, standard deviations and Pearson correlations for the dependent and key independent variables 
 
Key  variables  Mean S.d.  1 2 3 4 5 6  7 8 9 10  11  12  13 
1.  Career advancement 
2.  Job tenure, former job 
3.  International experience 
4.  MBA degree 
5.  Public status, former organization 
6.  Size, former organization  
7.  Oper excellence, former organization 
8.  Public status, current organization 
9.  Size, current organization 
10. Perceived operational excellence, current organization  
11.  Years of education 
12. Financial performance,  former organization 






































































































































































































Correlations greater than .05 or smaller than -.05 are significant at p<.005. Correlations greater than .075 or smaller than -.075 are significant at p<0.001 
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  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
 
Variables in the main equation: 
1.   Same company in former and current jobs 
2.   Firm fixed effects, former organization 
3.   C-level position, former job 
4.   EVP position, former job 
5.   Director position, former job 
6.   Managerial position, former job 
7.   Non-managerial position, former job 
8.   Asset management company, former job 
9.   Banks, former job 
10. Finance companies, former job 
11. Industries other than financial services, former job 
12. Professional function, former job 
13. General management function, former job 
14. Support functions, former job 
15. Tenure, former job 
16. International experience 
17. Years of education 
18. MBA 
19. Public status, former organization 
20. Size, former organization 
21. Operational excellence, former organization 
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Table 3. (continued) 
Selection equation 
 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
Variables  Coeff.  St. e.  Coeff.  St. e.  Coeff.  St. e. 
1.   Position, current company 
2.   Tenure, current company 
3.   General management, current 
4.   Finance function, current position 
5.   Asset management company  
6.   Finance company 
7.   Candidate status 
Estimated rho 
Wald chi-square  
























































Note: N= 1232;  +p<.1  *p<.05  **p<.01  ***p<.001; Models 2 and 3 use twostep estimates: regular models inflate the coefficients and 
result in a rho close to 1. 
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          Model 1                       Model 2                                        Model 3 
Variables in the main equation:  Coefficients  Stand. Error  Coefficients  Stand.  Error  Coefficients  Stand.  Error 
1.   Same company in former and current jobs 
2.   Firm fixed effects, current organization 
3.   C-level position, former job 
4.   EVP position, former job 
5.   Director position, former job 
6.   Managerial position, former job 
7.   Non-managerial position, former job 
8.   Asset management company, current job 
9.   Banks, current job 
10. Finance company, current job 
11. Professional function, current job 
12. General management function, current job 
13. Support functions, current job 
14. Tenure, former job 
15. International experience 
16. Years of education 
17. MBA 
18. Public status, current organization 
19. Size, current organization 
20. Operational excellence, current organization 
















































































































































Table 4. (continued) 
Selection equation 
 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
Variables  Coeff.  St. e.  Coeff.  St. e.  Coeff.  St. e. 
1.   Position, current company 
2.   Tenure, current company 
3.   General management, current 
4.   Finance function, current position 
5.   Asset management company  
6.   Finance company 
7.   Candidate status 
Estimated rho 
Wald chi-square  











































































  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
Variables  Coeff.  St. e.  Coeff.  St. e.  Coeff.  St. e.  Coeff.  St. e. 
1.   Same company  
2.   Firm fixed effects, current company 
3.   Firm fixed effects, former company 
4.   C-level position 
5.   EVP position 
6.   Director position 
7.   Managerial position 
8.   Non-managerial position 
9.   Asset management company 
10. Bank 
11. Finance company 
12. Professional 
13. General management 
14. Support functions 
15. Tenure, former job 
16. International experience 
17. MBA 
18. Industry change, to banks 
19. Industry change, asset mgmt 
20. Industry change, finance companies 
21. Function change, to prof. jobs 
22. Function change, to general mgmt 
23. Function change, to support jobs 
24. Change in operational excellence 
25. Change in organization size 

































































































































































































































  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
Variables  Coeff.  St. e.  Coeff.  St. e.  Coeff.  St. e.  Coeff.  St. e. 
1.   Position, current company 
2.   Tenure, current company 
3.   General management, current 
4.   Finance function, current position 
5.   Asset management company  
6.   Finance company 
7.   Candidate status 
Estimated rho 
Wald chi-square  
Incremental chi-square (df) 













































































Notes: N= 1239;     +p<.1  *p<.05  **p<.01  ***p<.001;    Models 2, 3 and 4 use two-step estimatesIE Working Paper                                  RH8-105-I                            04/11/2004 
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